Legislation and Objective Law - Written by Morris and Linda Tannehill.

Source: notbeinggoverned.com

Written by Morris and Linda Tannehill.

It has been objected by advocates of government that a laissez-faire society, since it would have no legislative mechanism, would lack the objective laws necessary to maintain social order and justice. This is to assume that objective law is the product of the deliberations of some legislative body, and this assumption, in turn, springs from a confusion about the meaning and nature of law.

The adjective “objective” refers to that which has an actual existence in reality. When used to refer to the content of one’s mind, it means ideas which are in accordance with the facts of reality. Mental objectivity cannot be “apart from the human mind,” but it is the product of perceiving the facts of reality, integrating them in a non-contradictory manner into one’s consciousness, and, thereby, reaching correct conclusions. The truth to be noted here is that the mind does not create reality; the function of human consciousness is to perceive reality—reality is the object, not the subject, of the reasoning process. (As students of philosophy will recognize, this paragraph notes the distinction between metaphysical objectivity and epistemological objectivity.)

Objective laws, then, are rules, or principles, which are expressions of the nature of reality; they are not the expressions of the subjective whims and prejudices of some person or group of people or of the culture as a whole. An objective law is reality-centered. It springs from the nature of the entities and processes to which it relates and can never conflict with that nature. For this reason, an objective law always “works,” while a law based on subjective whim, not firmly tied to reality, contradicts the nature of that to which it relates and so leads to confusion and destruction.

Because it is reality-centered, an objective law is always understandable to a man using his reason—that is, it always makes sense. It is also moral when regarding a principle of human behavior, because it operates in accordance with the nature of man and so acts to further his life, his welfare, and his interests as a rational being. With regard to human behavior, objective law, because it springs from the nature of reality—from things as they really are—must be practical, rational, and moral.

It is true that objective laws governing the nature of human relationships are necessary for the maintenance of societal order, but to conclude from this that statutory laws formulated by some legislative body are necessary for societal order is to be guilty of a non sequitur. In order to understand the nature of this non sequitur, it is necessary to examine two kinds of law—statutory law and natural law.

A natural law is a causal attribute which governs an entity’s actions, which attribute is inherent in that entity’s specific nature (the adjective “natural” means “of or pertaining to the nature of”—to what a thing is in reality). Since it is inherent in the nature of the entity to which it relates, natural law is always objective. It cannot help being reality-centered, because it is inherently inseparable from the nature of a real thing. This means that it’s practical—it must always “work,” because it relates to things as they really are (it could hardly relate to things as they really aren’t). Natural law can’t be repealed, nor does it have any loopholes. A man who “breaks” a natural law does so at his own peril. Immediately or eventually, it will break him.

A familiar example of natural law is the law of gravity. It is the nature of the earth to attract other bodies to itself, so when you drop something, it falls. This law is objective, universal, and inescapable. You may fly an airplane by making use of the natural laws of aerodynamics, but you have not thereby contradicted or repealed the law of gravity—the earth is still pulling downward on your plane, as you will discover if your engine fails.

Natural law applies to man as well as to his environment, because man is also an entity with a specific nature. Some actions are possible to man, and some are not. He can walk and run, but he can’t turn into a pine tree. Since he is a being with a specific nature, man requires a specific course of action for his survival and well-being. He must eat or he will starve. His body requires certain substances to remain healthy—vitamin C to prevent scurvy, for example. If he wants to know something, he must use his senses and his mind to learn it. If he wants the great survival-values of friendship, trade, division of labor and sharing of knowledge, he must seek and merit human companionship.

While it is generally recognized that man’s physical and even his mental nature are subject to the rule of natural law, it is just as generally assumed that the area of morality, and specifically moral human relationships, is completely outside the scope of natural law. This assumption is held tacidy, rather than being identified and defended, simply because it can’t be rationally defended. It is completely foolish to assert that man is a being with a specific nature and therefore subject to the rule of principles derived from that nature in all areas … except when he deals with other men. Do men cease to have a specific nature when they come into relationship with other men? Of course not!

Natural law does apply to human relationships, and it is just as objective, universal, and inescapable in this area as in any other. The proof of this is that actions have consequences … in the area of human interaction as surely as in the area of human medicine. A man who swallows poison will become ill (even if he has complete confidence that the poison is nothing more than vitamin pills). A man who aggresses against others will be distrusted, avoided, and probably made to repay his victims (if some government doesn’t interfere). A man who cheats his customers will be driven out of business by his more reputable competitors. The consequences of “breaking” natural law cannot be avoided. No matter how cleverly a man schemes, he will suffer if he insists on acting in a manner which contradicts the nature of human existence. The consequences may not be immediate, and they may not be readily apparent, but they are inescapable.

The free market is a product of the working of natural law in the area of human relationships, specifically economic relationships. Because man’s survival and well-being are not given to him, but must be achieved, men act to maximize their welfare (if they didn’t they couldn’t keep on living).. To maximize their welfare, they trade with other men, and when they trade, each man tries to get the best possible “deal.” Buyers bid against each other and push prices up. Sellers bid against each other and push prices down. At the point where the two forces meet, the market price is set, and everyone who wants to trade at that price can do so without creating surpluses or shortages. Thus, the law of supply and demand, and all other market laws, are really natural laws, directly derived from the nature and needs of that specific entity, man. The fact that market laws are natural laws explains why the free market works so well without any outside regulation. Natural law is always practical—it always “works.”

Government is an artificial construct which, because of what it is, is in opposition to natural law. There is nothing in the nature of man which demands that he be governed by other men (if there were, then we would have to find someone to govern the governors, for they, too, would be men with a need to be governed). In fact, the nature of man is such that, in order to survive and be happy, he must be able to make his own decisions and control his own life … a right which is unavoidably violated by governments. The ruinous consequences of government’s inescapable opposition to natural law are written in blood and human degradation across the pages of all man’s history.

The operations of natural law in human relationships are much less apparent in a governmental society than in a laissez-faire society, because government, in an effort to get something for nothing, tries to dissolve or ignore the laws of cause and effect and so obscures the consequences of many actions (particularly bad ones). Politicians want power which they have no right to and plaudits which they have not earned, so they promise money which isn’t theirs and favors they have no business granting. For instance, they promise to raise the wages of labor (a thing which only an increase in production can do, since the money for wages can’t come out of nothing). When they pass a minimum wage statute, they seem to have bypassed natural-economic law, but actually they’ve only obscured it. Employers are forced to compensate for the wage increases to some of their employees by laying off others, which creates a class of jobless, hopeless poor. Wage rates go up for some at the expense of falling to zero for others. Natural law can’t be legislated out of existence, no matter how hard the politicians try, because it is inherent in the nature of things. Natural law is just as operative in a governmental society as it would be in a laissez-faire one; it is simply harder to trace because of the complicated meddlings of the bureaucrats,

The tacit assumption that natural law does not apply to human relationships has led men to the belief that society must have a system of statutory laws to “fill the gap” and maintain social order. At the very least, it is believed that statutory law is necessary to codify natural law so that it will be objective, of universal application, and easily understood by all.

Statutory law is a code of rules established and enforced by governmental authority. Any particular statutory law may be based on an objective principle, or it may be based on a principle which is contrary to the nature of reality. It may even be a range-of-the-moment measure with no basis in any sort of principle at all (such laws are characteristic of governments when they feel themselves to be in crisis situations). There is nothing which can be built into the nature of a government which will guarantee that all, or even a majority, of the laws it passes will be based on objective principles—in fact, history shows that the reverse is usually the case; most laws are based on the subjective whim of some politician.

Statutory laws which are not based on objective principles are immoral and inescapably harmful; anything which is in opposition to reality—to things as they really are—can’t work. Laws which are based on objective principles are merely a legal restatement of natural law, and are thus unnecessary. A man can identify a natural law, and he can even write it down in a textbook for other men to understand, but he cannot “pass” it because it already exists—inescapably. Once the natural law has been identified and understood, nothing more can be added by restating it in legal form and “making it compulsory.” It already is compulsory, by its very nature.

A statutory law, even one based on an objective principle, must be written before the occurrence of the crimes which it is designed to inhibit or punish. Since every crime is committed by a different individual in a different set of circumstances, the law cannot possibly be made to fit all cases (except, perhaps, by making it so flexible as to nullify it altogether). This means that, although the principle behind the law was objective (reality-centered), the application of the law to specific circumstances cannot be objective. An objective principle is firm and unchanging because it is rooted in the nature of things, but the application of this unchanging principle must vary to fit the circumstances of various cases. Unless the application fits the case, it is non-objective and, therefore, unjust.
No matter how learned a body of legislators or how long and assiduously they debate, they can never reach the state of omniscience necessary to predict and allow for every circumstance of every individual case which will ever come within the jurisdiction of their law. In fact, by the very act of writing down the provisions of the law and making them binding on everyone in an equal manner regardless of individual variations, legislators freeze the application of their law so that it cannot be objective. Thus, no statutory law, even if based on objective principle, can be objective in its application.

Legislators are aware of the necessity of making laws flexible to fit a range of cases, and they do their best to solve this problem. They try to foresee and provide for as many situations as possible as they write each law, and they usually stipulate flexible punishments (a prison sentence of from two to ten years, for instance) which leaves the final decision up to the judge of each case. This sincere attempt, however, has the inevitable effect of making the law voluminous, complex, unwieldy, and difficult to interpret or even read. Legislation becomes bogged down in reams of words and men are often convicted or released on the basis of nothing more than the technical interpretation of an obscure wording in some statute. In an effort to be sufficiently flexible and yet totally precise, legislators often write laws of such appalling and complicated intricacy that even lawyers (who prosper in direct proportion to the size and complexity of the legal system) are confused. There are tens of thousands of complicated statutes, each in legal terms so specialized that it might as well be in a foreign language, and yet the puzzled citizen is curtly told that ignorance of the law is no excuse!

The attempt to make legislation flexible enough to fit individual cases also nullifies the universality of the law. A judge who has the option of giving a sentence which may be anywhere from two to ten years has nothing to guide him in his choice except his own private beliefs. Some judges are habitually lenient, and some habitually harsh, so that the fate of the accused usually depends as much on the personality and mood of his judge as on the actual circumstances of the case. Changing from a system of punishment in the form of prison sentences to a system of justice in the form of reparations payments to the victims would do nothing to solve this problem as long as the legal-judicial mechanism remained a function of government rather than of the free market. Free-market arbiters are guided in their choices by the desires of consumers, with profit and loss as a built-in “correction mechanism.” But government judges have no signals to guide their decisions. Even if they wanted to please their “customers,” they would have no signals to tell them how to do so. A government judge, faced with a flexible penalty, can have nothing to guide him but his own opinions and whims.

Natural law, as applied to human relationships in a free-market context, is objective in both its principles and its application. While the principles of natural law are unchanging, the application of these principles always fits each case, because the natural law involved in any case is derived from the nature of each individual and the unique situation in that particular case. When an aggression is committed, it results in a loss to the victim. This loss is specific and individual for each case. The victim lost a sum of money, or his car, or a leg, and reparations payments are based on the worth of that specific value. In setting the worth of losses (particularly non-exchangeable ones) the arbiters are governed by the value-structure of the consumers who purchase their service, and they have profit and loss signals to guide them. Each case is decided on its own merits. The aggressor’s fate is determined on the basis of his own past and present actions—it isn’t arbitrarily decided by a group of elected strangers acting without any knowledge of the particular case (and even before it happened).

Natural law, as applied by the free market, is also very short, simple, and easily understood. There is only one basic rule of just human relationships: No man or group of men may attempt to deprive a man of a value by the initiation of physical force, the threat of force, or any substitute for force (such as fraud). All other rules, such as prohibitions against murder, kidnapping, theft, counterfeiting, etc., are merely obvious derivatives of this one basic natural law. A man who wants to know whether he is acting properly toward his fellow man doesn’t need a library of legal tomes and a university education. All he needs to do is ask himself one simple question, “Am I causing anyone a loss of value by an act of coercion?” As long as he can honestly answer no to that one question, he need fear no law or retaliatory force.

This basic natural law of human relationships is already tacitly understood by almost everyone throughout the world. It finds common expression in such terms as, “It’s always wrong to start the fight.” It is the widespread and almost automatic compliance with this natural law by the majority of people which accounts for the fact that human relationships have not completely disintegrated into bloody chaos in spite of the constant push of governments in this direction. Most people live with their neighbors quite peacefully on the basis of this natural law, and they very rarely call on a policeman or judge to take care of their disagreements. And they do so, for the most part, without even consciously identifying the natural law which guides their actions.

The assumption that statutory law is necessary to a society involves the more basic assumption that a legislative body has the moral right to pass laws which are binding on the rest of the population. Advocates of democracy claim that the fact that legislators are elected by the people gives them the right to “represent the people” in matters of legislation. But “the people” is a collectivistic concept; there is no such entity as “the people” which lives, breathes, has interests, opinions and goals. There are only individuals. Do legislators, then, have a moral right to represent the individuals “under their jurisdiction?”

In a democracy, the function of the legislature is, theoretically, to discover what is in “the public interest” and to pass legislation governing people accordingly. But just as there is no such entity as “the people,” there is no such thing as “the public interest.” There are only the multitude of individual interests of all the great variety of people who are subject to the government. So when legislators pass a law “in the public interest,” they are actually favoring the interests of some of their citizens while sacrificing the interests of others. Since legislators, being elected officials, need money and votes, they usually favor the interests of those with political pull and sacrifice the interests of those without it. Also, since government’s only source of gain is its productive citizens (the non-productive ones have nothing for government to take), the competent are usually sacrificed in favor of the incompetent, including the politicians.

This type of injustice is inescapably built into the structure of government. A government is a coercive monopoly which forces everyone in its geographical area to deal with it. As such, it must prevent its citizens from freely choosing between competing sellers the services which suit them best. Every citizen is forced to accept government services and live by government standards, regardless of whether they are in his interest or not.

No matter how “democratic” and “limited” a government is, it cannot actually represent the interests of each one of the multitude of diverse individuals who are its citizens. But these individual interests are the only interests which really exist, because there is no such entity as “the public” and, therefore, no such thing as “the public interest.” Since government can’t represent the interests of each of its citizens, it must exist by sacrificing the interests of some to the alleged interests of others; and sacrifice always decreases the total store of value.

In a free market, there is no such thing as a coercive monopoly. Every man is free to pursue his own interests as long as he accords the same right to everyone else, and no one’s interests are sacrificed to “the public good” or “the will of the majority.” In a laissez-faire society, a man who wants to buy a good or service may patronize any business whose merchandise or service pleases him. If he prefers Brand X, he is not forced to buy Brand Y because 51% of his fellow consumers prefer Y and the system allegedly can’t be run without unanimity.

But even if they could avoid sacrificing the interests of citizens, elected legislators still wouldn’t be justified in making laws which were binding on anyone other than themselves. Opinions, even majority opinions, don’t create truth—truth is true, regardless of what anyone thinks about it. Fifty million Frenchmen can be wrong, and frequently are. So, if the majority of voters are completely wrong in their support of a candidate, or the majority of legislators are terribly mistaken in their judgment of a law, their majority opinion doesn’t change the fact that they are wrong. It is sheer superstition to believe that if enough people (or, perhaps, enough learned and influential people) think a thing is so, this will make it so. A law may be passed by a majority of legislators who were elected by a majority of citizens, and yet it may very well be immoral and destructive despite the majority’s collective delusions to the contrary. And no group of people, even if they are in the majority, have the right to force an immoral and destructive law on anyone.

Some advocates of “limited government” have attempted to get around this problem by stipulating that the government must be limited to a very strict constitution to keep it confined to its “proper” functions and prevent it from passing immoral and destructive laws. But this is to ignore the fact that those who write the constitution and those who enforce it must be elected by majority vote (or else appointed by those who are elected). A constitution is only as good as the men who write and enforce it, and if majority opinion can’t create truth in matters of legislation, it can’t create truth in matters of constitutional formulation and interpretation, either. If it is wrong to employ the mass opinion-mongering method of voting to determine the policies of a government, it is even more wrong to use it to determine the form and structure of that government.

Besides, the idea of a written constitution as a social contract between the people and their government is a myth. A contract is only binding on those who sign it, which means that a contract between the people and the government would have to be signed by every citizen in order to be binding on “the people.” The Constitution of the United States wasn’t even signed by the citizens who were alive at the time it was Written, let alone by all the millions born later who are supposedly bound by it.1 If one were to institute a constitution and have it signed by every individual who wished to be bound by it, one would also have to admit the right of those who did not agree to refuse to sign and even to make their own arrangements for their protection, in which case one would have, not a government, but a business in competition with other businesses in a free market.

Government laws and constitutions can never be either right or practical. Statutory law, which is supposed to codify natural law to order to make it objective, of universal application, and easily understood, does just the opposite of all three. Natural law is objective in both its principles and its application because it is reality-centered and derived from the nature of the entities involved in each case. Statutory law, even when based on objective principles, cannot possibly be objective in its application because it can’t vary with varying cases. Natural law is universally applicable because it is part of the very nature of things, and nothing can be separated from its own nature. Statutory law cannot be universally and equally applicable because if written inflexibly it won’t fit individual cases, and if written flexibly it leaves judges with nothing to guide their decisions. The natural law of human relationships is easily understood and can be stated in one brief sentence. Statutory law is a writhing mass of impenetrable complexity, and it cannot avoid being so because it must attempt to fit a multitude of varying circumstances which haven’t even happened yet.

Because the free market is a product of the working of natural law, it facilitates the application of natural law to any field in which it is involved. The rules which would govern the businesses of protecting values, arbitrating disputes, and rectifying injustice are merely outgrowths of general economic law, which is an outgrowth of natural law. The same economic rules which would guarantee consumers in a free market the best possible products, service, and prices in their grocery stores and which would protect them from dishonest and unscrupulous drug manufacturers, would work in the areas of protection, arbitration, and rectification. Natural law doesn’t give up in puzzled helplessness just because some particular area has always been controlled by political bureaucrats.

Free men, acting in a free market, would manage their affairs in accordance with natural law. The market is, itself, a product of natural law and, therefore, acts to penalize those who “break” that law. Statutory law is a clumsy, anachronistic, and unjust hindrance and is no more necessary to regulate the affairs of men than are kings and tribal witch doctors.

Natural Law - A Classic Work by Lysander Spooner

Source: notbeinggoverned.com



This Classic Work was written by Lysander Spooner

Part One

Chapter 1: The Science of Justice

Section I

The science of mine and thine—the science of justice—is the science of all human rights; of all a man’s rights of person and property; of all his rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

It is the science which alone can tell any man what he can, and cannot, do; what he can, and cannot, have; what he can, and cannot, say, without infringing the rights of any other person.

It is the science of peace; and the only science of peace; since it is the science which alone can tell us on what conditions mankind can live in peace, or ought to live in peace, with each other.

These conditions are simply these: viz., first, that each man shall do, towards every other, all that justice requires him to do; as, for example, that he shall pay his debts, that he shall return borrowed or stolen property to its owner, and that he shall make reparation for any injury he may have done to the person or property of another.

The second condition is, that each man shall abstain from doing so another, anything which justice forbids him to do; as, for example, that he shall abstain from committing theft, robbery, arson, murder, or any other crime against the person or property of another.

So long as these conditions are fulfilled, men are at peace, and ought to remain at peace, with each other. But when either of these conditions is violated, men are at war. And they must necessarily remain at war until justice is re-established.

Through all time, so far as history informs us, wherever mankind have attempted to live in peace with each other, both the natural instincts, and the collective wisdom of the human race, have acknowledged and prescribed, as an indispensable condition, obedience to this one only universal obligation: viz., that each should live honestly towards every other.

The ancient maxim makes the sum of a man’s legal duty to his fellow men to be simply this: “to live honestly, to hurt no one, to give to every one his due”.

This entire maxim is really expressed in the single words, to live honestly; since to live honestly is to hurt no one, and give to every one his due.

Section II

Man, no doubt, owes many other moral duties to his fellow men; such as to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, shelter the homeless, care for the sick, protect the defenseless, assist the weak, and enlighten the ignorant. But these are simply moral duties, of which each man must be his own judge, in each particular case, as to whether, and how, and how far, he can, or will, perform them. But of his legal duty—that is, of his duty to live honestly towards his fellow men—his fellow men not only may judge, but, for their own protection, must judge. And, if need be, they may rightfully compel him to perform it. They may do this, acting singly, or in concert. They may do it on the instant, as the necessity arises, or deliberately and systematically, if they prefer to do so, and the exigency will admit of it.

Section III

Although it is the right of anybody and everybody—of any one man, or set of men, no less than another—to repel injustice, and compel justice, for themselves, and for all who may be wronged, yet to avoid the errors that are liable to result from haste and passion, and that everybody, who desires it, may rest secure in the assurance of protection, without a resort to force, it is evidently desirable that men should associate, so far as they freely and voluntarily can do so, for the maintenance of justice among themselves, and for mutual protection against other wrong-doers. It is also in the highest degree desirable that they should agree upon some plan or system of judicial proceedings, which, in the trial of causes, should secure caution, deliberation, thorough investigation, and, as far as possible, freedom from every influence but the simple desire to do justice.

Yet such associations can be rightful and desirable only in so far as they are purely voluntary. No man can rightfully be coerced into joining one, or supporting one, against his will. His own interest, his own judgement, and his own conscience alone must determine whether he will join this association, or that; or whether he will join any. If he chooses to depend, for the protection of his own rights, solely upon himself, and upon such voluntary assistance as other persons may freely offer to him when the necessity for it arises, he has a perfect right to do so. And this course would be a reasonably safe one for him to follow, so long as he himself should manifest the ordinary readiness of mankind, in like cases, to go to the assistance and defence of injured persons; and should also himself “live honestly, hurt no one, and give to every one his due.” For such a man is reasonably sure of always giving friends and defenders enough in case of need, whether he shall have joined any association, or not.

Certainly no man can rightfully be required to join, or support, an association whose protection he does not desire. Nor can any man be reasonably or rightfully expected to join, or support, any association whose plans, or method of proceeding, he does not approve, as likely to accomplish its professed purpose of maintaining justice, and at the same time itself avoid doing injustice. To join, or support, one that would, in his opinion, be inefficient, would be absurd. To join or support one that, in his opinion, would itself do injustice, would be criminal. He must, therefore, be left at the same liberty to join, or not to join, an association for this purpose, as for any other, according as his own interest, discretion, or conscience shall dictate.

An association for mutual protection against injustice is like an association for mutual protection against fire or shipwreck. And there is no more right or reason in compelling any man to join or support one of these associations, against his will, his judgement, or his conscience, than there is in compelling him to join or support any other, whose benefits (if it offer any) he does not want, or whose purposes or methods he does not approve.

Section IV

No objection can be made to these voluntary associations upon the ground that they would lack that knowledge of justice, as a science, which would be necessary to enable them to maintain justice, and themselves avoid doing injustice. Honesty, justice, natural law, is usually a very plain and simple matter, easily understood by common minds. Those who desire to know what it is, in any particular case, seldom have to go far to find it. It is true, it must be learned, like any other science. But it is also true that it is very easily learned. Although as illimitable in its applications as the infinite relations and dealings of men with each other, it is, nevertheless, made up of a few simple elementary principles, of the truth and justice of which every ordinary mind has an almost intuitive perception. And almost all men have the same perceptions of what constitutes justice, or of what justice requires, when they understand alike the facts from which their inferences are to be drawn.

Men living in contact with each other, and having intercourse together, cannot avoid learning natural law, to a very great extent, even if they would. The dealings of men with men, their separate possessions and their individual wants, and the disposition of every man to demand, and insist upon, whatever he believes to be his due, and to resent and resist all invasions of what he believes to be his rights, are continually forcing upon their minds the questions, Is this act just? or is it unjust? Is this thing mine? or is it his? And these are questions of natural law; questions which, in regard to the great mass of cases, are answered alike by the human mind everywhere.(1)

Children learn the fundamental principles of natural law at a very early age. Thus they very early understand that one child must not, without just cause, strike or otherwise hurt, another; that one child must not assume any arbitrary control or domination over another; that one child must not, either by force, deceit, or stealth, obtain possession of anything that belongs to another; that if one child commits any of these wrongs against another, it is not only the right of the injured child to resist, and, if need be, punish the wrongdoer, and compel him to make reparation, but that it is also the right, and the moral duty, of all other children, and all other persons, to assist the injured party in defending his rights, and redressing his wrongs. These are fundamental principles of natural law, which govern the most important transactions of man with man. Yet children learn them earlier than they learn that three and three are six, or five and five ten. Their childish plays, even, could not be carried on without a constant regard to them, and it is equally impossible for persons of any age to live together in peace on any other conditions.

It would be no extravagance to say that, in most cases, if not in all, mankind at large, young and old, learn this natural law long before they have learned the meanings of the words by which we describe it. In truth, it would be impossible to make them understand the real meanings of the words, if they did not understand the nature of the thing itself. To make them understand the meanings of the words justice and injustice before knowing the nature of the things themselves, would be as impossible as it would be to make them understand the meanings of the words heat and cold, wet and dry, light and darkness, white and black, one and two, before knowing the nature of the things themselves. Men necessarily must know sentiments and ideas, no less than material things, before they can know the meanings of the words by which we describe them.

Chapter II: The Science of Justice (Continued)

Section I

If justice be not a natural principle, it is no principle at all. If it be not a natural principle, there is no such thing as justice. If it be not a natural principle, all that men have ever said or written about it, from time immemorial, has been said and written about that which had no existence. If it be not a natural principle, all the appeals for justice that have ever been heard, and all the struggles for justice that have ever been witnessed, have been appeals and struggles for a mere fantasy, a vagary of the imagination, and not for a reality.

If justice be not a natural principle, then there is no such thing as injustice; and all the crimes of which the world has been the scene, have been no crimes at all; but only simple events, like the falling of the rain, or the setting of the sun; events of which the victims had no more reason to complain than they had to complain of the running of the streams, or the growth of vegetation.

If justice be not a natural principle, governments (so-called) have no more right or reason to take cognizance of it, or to pretend or profess to take cognizance of it, than they have to take cognizance, or to pretend or profess to take cognizance, of any other nonentity; and all their professions of establishing justice, or of maintaining justice, or of rewarding justice, are simply the mere gibberish of fools, or the frauds of imposters.

But if justice be a natural principle, then it is necessarily an immutable one; and can no more be changed—by any power inferior to that which established it—than can the law of gravitation, the laws of light, the principles of mathematics, or any other natural law or principle whatever; and all attempts or assumptions, on the part of any man or body of men—whether calling themselves governments, or by any other name—to set up their own commands, wills, pleasure, or discretion, in the place of justice, as a rule of conduct for any human being, are as much an absurdity, an usurpation, and a tyranny, as would be their attempts to set up their own commands, wills, pleasure, or discretion in the place of any and all the physical, mental, and moral laws of the universe.

Section II

If there be any such principle as justice, it is, of necessity, a natural principle; and, as such, it is a matter of science, to be learned and applied like any other science. And to talk of either adding to, or taking from, it, by legislation, is just as false, absurd, and ridiculous as it would be to talk of adding to, or taking from, mathematics, chemistry, or any other science, by legislation.

Section III

If there be in nature such a principle as justice, nothing can be added to, or taken from, its supreme authority by all the legislation of which the entire human race united are capable. And all the attempts of the human race, or of any portion of it, to add to, or take from, the supreme authority of justice, in any case whatever, is of no more obligation upon any single human being than is the idle wind.

Section IV

If there be such a principle as justice, or natural law, it is the principle, or law, that tells us what rights were given to every human being at his birth; what rights are, therefore, inherent in him as a human being, necessarily remain with him during life; and, however capable of being trampled upon, are incapable of being blotted out, extinguished, annihilated, or separated or eliminated from his nature as a human being, or deprived of their inherent authority or obligation.

On the other hand, if there be no such principle as justice, or natural law, then every human being came into the world utterly destitute of rights; and coming into the world destitute of rights, he must necessarily forever remain so. For if no one brings any rights with him into the world, clearly no one can ever have any rights of his own, or give any to another. And the consequence would be that mankind could never have any rights; and for them to talk of any such things as their rights, would be to talk of things that never had, never will have, and never can have any existence.

Section V

If there be such a natural principle as justice, it is necessarily the highest, and consequently the only and universal, law for all those matters to which it is naturally applicable. And, consequently, all human legislation is simply and always an assumption of authority and dominion, where no right of authority or dominion exists. It is, therefore, simply and always an intrusion, an absurdity, an usurpation, and a crime.

On the other hand, if there be no such natural principle as justice, there can be no such thing as dishonesty; and no possible act of either force or fraud, committed by one man against the person or property of another, can be said to be unjust or dishonest; or be complained of, or prohibited, or punished as such. In short, if there be no such principle as justice, there can be no such acts as crimes; and all the professions of governments, so called, that they exist, either in whole or in part, for the punishment or prevention of crimes, are professions that they exist for the punishment or prevention of what never existed, nor ever can exist. Such professions are therefore confessions that, so far as crimes are concerned, governments have no occasion to exist; that there is nothing for them to do, and that there is nothing that they can do. They are confessions that the governments exist for the punishment and prevention of acts that are, in their nature, simple impossibilities.

Section VI

If there be in nature such a principle as justice, such a principle as honesty, such principles as we describe by the words mine and thine, such principles as men’s natural rights of person and property, then we have an immutable and universal law; a law that we can learn, as we learn any other science; a law that tells us what is just and what is unjust, what is honest and what is dishonest, what things are mine and what things are thine, what are my rights of person and property and what are your rights of person and property, and where is the boundary between each and all of my rights of person and property and each and all of your rights of person and property. And this law is the paramount law, and the same law, over all the world, at all times, and for all peoples; and will be the same paramount and only law, at all times, and for all peoples, so long as man shall live upon the earth.

But if, on the other hand, there be in nature no such principle as justice, no such principle as honesty, no such principle as men’s natural rights of person or property, then all such words as justice and injustice, honesty and dishonesty, all such words as mine and thine, all words that signify that one thing is one man’s property and that another thing is another man’s property, all words that are used to describe men’s natural rights of person or property, all such words as are used to describe injuries and crimes, should be struck out of all human languages as having no meanings; and it should be declared, at once and forever, that the greatest force and the greatest frauds, for the time being, are the supreme and only laws for governing the relations of men with each other; and that, from henceforth, all persons and combinations of persons—those that call themselves governments, as well as all others—are to be left free to practice upon each other all the force, and all the fraud, of which they are capable.

Section VII

If there be no such science as justice, there can be no science of government; and all the rapacity and violence, by which, in all ages and nations, a few confederated villains have obtained the mastery over the rest of mankind, reduced them to poverty and slavery, and established what they called governments to keep them in subjection, have been as legitimate examples of government as any that the world is ever to see.

Section VIII

If there be in nature such a principle as justice, it is necessarily the only political principle there ever was, or ever will be. All the other so-called political principles, which men are in the habit of inventing, are not principles at all. They are either the mere conceits of simpletons, who imagine they have discovered something better than truth, and justice, and universal law; or they are mere devices and pretences, to which selfish and knavish men resort as means to get fame, and power, and money.

Chapter III: Natural Law Contrasted With Legislation

Section I

Natural law, natural justice, being a principle that is naturally applicable and adequate to the rightful settlement of every possible controversy that can arise among men; being too, the only standard by which any controversy whatever, between man and man, can be rightfully settled; being a principle whose protection every man demands for himself, whether he is willing to accord it to others, or not; being also an immutable principle, one that is always and everywhere the same, in all ages and nations; being self-evidently necessary in all times and places; being so entirely impartial and equitable towards all; so indispensable to the peace of mankind everywhere; so vital to the safety and welfare of every human being; being, too, so easily learned, so generally known, and so easily maintained by such voluntary associations as all honest men can readily and rightully form for that purpose—being such a principle as this, these questions arise, viz.: Why is it that it does not universally, or well nigh universally, prevail? Why is it that it has not, ages ago, been established throughout the world as the one only law that any man, or all men, could rightfully be compelled to obey? Why is it that any human being ever conceived that anything so self-evidently superfluous, false, absurd, and atrocious as all legislation necessarily must be, could be of any use to mankind, or have any place in human affairs?

Section II

The answer is, that through all historic times, wherever any people have advanced beyond the savage state, and have learned to increase their means of sub-sistence by the cultivation of soil, a greater or less number of them have associated and organized themselves as robbers, to plunder and enslave all others, who had either accumulated any property that could be seized, or had shown, by their labor, that they could be made to contribute to the support or pleasure of those who should enslave them.

These bands of robbers, small in number at fist, have increased their power by uniting with each other, inventing warlike weapons, disciplining themselves, and perfecting their organizations as military forces, and dividing their plunder (including their captives) among themselves, either in such proportions as have been previously agreed on, or in such as their leaders (always desirous to increase the number of their followers) should prescribe.

The success of these bands of robbers was an easy thing, for the reason that those whom they plundered and ensalved were comparatively defenceless; being scattered thinly over the country; engaged wholly in trying, by rude implements and heavy labor, to extort a subsistence from the soil; having no weapons of war, other than sticks and stones; having no military discipline or organization, and no means of concentrating their forces, or acting in concert, when suddenly attacked. Under these circumstances, the only alternative left them for saving even their lives, or the lives of their families, was to yield up not only the crops they had gathered, and the lands they had cultivated, but themselves and their families also as slaves.

Thenceforth their fate was, as slaves, to cultivate for others the lands they had before cultivated for themselves. Being driven constantly to their labor, wealth slowly increased; but all went into the hands of their tyrants.

These tyrants, living solely on plunder, and on the labor of their slaves, and applying all their energies to the seizure of still more plunder, and the enslavement of still other defenceless persons; increasing, too, their numbers, perfecting their organizations, and multiplying their weapons of war, they extend their conquests until, in order to hold what they have already got, it becomes necessary for them to act systematically, and cooperate with each other in holding their slaves in subjection.

But all this they can do only by establishing what they call a government, and making what they call laws.

All the great governments of the world—those now existing, as well as those that have passed away—have been of this character. They have been mere bands of robbers, who have associated for purposes of plunder, conquest, and the enslavement of their fellow men. And their laws, as they have called them, have been only such agreements as they have found it necessary to enter into, in order to maintain their organizations, and act together in plundering and enslaving others, and in securing to each his agreed share of the spoils.

All these laws have had no more real obligation than have the agreements which brigands, bandits, and pirates find it necessary to enter into with each other, for the more successful accomplishment of their crimes, and the more peaceable division of their spoils.

Thus substantially all the legislation of the world has had its origin in the desires of one class—of persons to plunder and enslave others, and hold them as property.

Section III

In process of time, the robber, or slaveholding, class—who had seized all the lands, and held all the means of creating wealth—began to discover that the easiest mode of managing their slaves, and making them profitable, was not for each slaveholder to hold his specified number of slaves, as he had done before, and as he would hold so many cattle, but to give them so much liberty as would throw upon themselves (the slaves) the responsibility of their own subsistence, and yet compel them to sell their labor to the land-holding class—their former owners—for just what the latter might choose to give them.

Of course, these liberated slaves, as some have erroneously called them, having no lands, or other property, and no means of obtaining an independent subsistence, had no alternative—to save themselves from starvation—but to sell their labor to the landholders, in exchange only for the coarsest necessaries of life; not always for so much even as that.

These liberated slaves, as they were called, were now scarcely less slaves than they were before. Their means of subsistence were perhaps even more precarious than when each had his own owner, who had an interest to preserve his life. They were liable, at the caprice or interest of the landholders, to be thrown out of home, employment, and the opportunity of even earning a subsistence by their labor. They were, therefore, in large numbers, driven to the necessity of begging, stealing, or starving; and became, of course, dangerous to the property and quiet of their late masters.

The consequence was, that these late owners found it necessary, for their own safety and the safety of their property, to organize themselves more perfectly as a government and make laws for keeping these dangerous people in subjection; that is, laws fixing the prices at which they should be compelled to labor, and also prescribing fearful punishments, even death itself, for such thefts and tresspasses as they were driven to commit, as their only means of saving them-selves from starvation.

These laws have continued in force for hundreds, and, in some countries, for thousands of years; and are in force to-day, in greater or less severity, in nearly all the countries on the globe.

The purpose and effect of these laws have been to maintain, in the hands of the robber, or slave holding class, a monopoly of all lands, and, as far as possible, of all other means of creating wealth; and thus to keep the great body of laborers in such a state of poverty and dependence, as would compel them to sell their labor to their tyrants for the lowest prices at which life could be sustained.

The result of all this is, that the little wealth there is in the world is all in the hands of a few—that is, in the hands of the law-making, slave-holding class; who are now as much slaveholders in spirit as they ever were, but who accomplish their purposes by means of the laws they make for keeping the laborers in subjection and dependence, instead of each one’s owning his individual slaves as so many chattels.

Thus the whole business of legislation, which has now grown to such gigantic proportions, had its origin in the conspiracies, which have always existed among the few, for the purpose of holding the many in subjection, and extorting from them their labor, and all the profits of their labor.

And the real motives and spirit which lie at the foundation of all legislation—notwithstanding all the pretences and disguises by which they attempt to hide themselves—are the same to-day as they always have been. They whole purpose of this legislation is simply to keep one class of men in subordination and servitude to another.

Section IV

What, then, is legislation? It is an assumption by one man, or body of men, of absolute, irresponsible dominion over all other men whom they call subject to their power. It is the assumption by one man, or body of men, of a right to subject all other men to their will and their service. It is the assumption by one man, or body of men, of a right to abolish outright all the natural rights, all the natural liberty of all other men; to make all other men their slaves; to arbitrarily dictate to all other men what they may, and may not, do; what they may, and may not, have; what they may, and may not, be. It is, in short, the assumption of a right to banish the principle of human rights, the principle of justice itself, from off the earth, and set up their own personal will, pleasure, and interest in its place. All this, and nothing less, is involved in the very idea that there can be any such thing as human legislation that is obligatory upon those upon whom it is imposed.

Notes

1. Sir William Jones, an English judge in India, and one of the most learned judges that ever lived, learned in Asiatic as well as European law, says: “It is pleasing to remark the similarity, or, rather, the identity, of those conclusions which pure, unbiased reason, to all ages and nations, seldom fails to draw, in such juridical inquiries as are not fettered and manacled by positive institutions.”—jones on bailments, 133.

He means here to say that, when no law has been made in violation of justice, judicial tribunals, “in all ages and nations, ” have “seldom” failed to agree as to what justice is.